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Despite the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the confrontation between Russia and
the West, Greater Eurasia has remained relatively stable, contrary to
expectations that the region would be embroiled in conflict and wracked by
instability. It wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that a confluence of
geographical, political, institutional and economic factors has made Greater
Eurasia resilient to the intensifying major power competition around the Greater
Eurasian region. First, the core of Greater Eurasia is geographically removed from the primary
theaters of confrontation between major powers. While Eastern Europe and the
Baltic states are situated on the front lines of the de facto conflict between
Russia and NATO, the Central Asian countries, Mongolia and most of East Asia are
removed from these geopolitical flashpoints. Their distance from the theaters of
confrontation buffers them from the worst destabilizing effects of the great
power rivalry centered in Europe. Second, most states in Greater Eurasia are politically stable and resilient
to radicalization. While China and Russia suppress any separatist and extremist
movements within their borders and the Central Asian countries have mechanisms
to prevent external forces from fomenting trouble within their borders, Mongolia
has a stable government, and the Republic of Korea and Japan, as mature and
liberal countries, are resistant to extreme political movements. The stability
of the region's countries insulates Greater Eurasia from disruptive spillover
effects of conflicts outside the region. Third, regional institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
and the Eurasian Economic Union have proven more resilient than European blocs
and organizations like the European Union and the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe to external geopolitical disputes. The SCO and the EAEU
are pragmatic organizations and were built based on the core security and
economic interests shared by the member states, rather than on self-proclaimed
values or political ideals which can be undermined by interstate conflicts.
Their solid issue-based foundation enables them to weather geopolitical
storms. Fourth, economic forces, especially market forces, act as a stabilizing
factor for Greater Eurasia so long as they are not excessively constrained by
political disputes. China, Russia, and the countries of Central Asia and the
Caucasus region stand to economically benefit from increased trade, investment,
infrastructure and connectivity in Eurasia. These mutual economic interests and
incentives help transcend political divides and foster beneficial
interdependence. Even South Caucasus, typically considered Greater Eurasia's most volatile
sub-region, is shaped more by local dynamics than by the broader global power
contest. Regional powers such as Turkiye and Iran play a bigger role in the
region's affairs than alien major powers. And differences and disagreements, if
any, remain localized and contained rather than escalating into wider
destabilizing interstate conflicts. Moreover, the institutions of Greater Eurasia were established under
different historical and geopolitical conditions than Western blocs and
organizations such as the EU and the OSCE. The SCO doesn't have the complex
balance of power politics that has traditionally defined the OSCE. Similarly,
the EAEU does not attempt to forge an intricate equilibrium of diverse interests
that defines the EU. It is the pragmatic institutional design centered on the
core interests of the region's countries that makes Eurasian organizations
result-oriented and resilient to external pressures. Also, economies across Greater Eurasia depend relatively less on external
political factors, despite not being totally immune to global shocks. As a
result, intra-regional economic integration and domestic development, not
reliance on external markets, drive their economic growth. And it is this
economic self-sufficiency that gives them stability. True, stability in Greater Eurasia cannot be taken for granted forever, but
objective geographical, political, institutional and economic factors make the
region more stable according to standard international relations theories amid
the intensifying major power competition. The region's stability will depend on
how long the buffering factors can withstand the increasingly volatile global
environment. Preventing the emergence of a stable order in Eurasia has always been the US
strategic goal by the end of the World War II. Therefore, maintaining stability
and peace in Eurasia is fundamental to the interests of world peace and
development. Eurasia accounts for a significant share of the world's population
and economy. If conflict and confrontation take hold, it would not only hamper
regional development but also impact the entire world. Thus, countries should
look beyond differences, enhance mutual trust and cooperation, and enable
Eurasia to become an important driver of world peace and prosperity, rather than
a hotbed of conflict. Only in this way can all humanity share in development
opportunities and work together to create a better future.
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